Peer-Reviewed Articles

"For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors" American Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming.

The Political Economy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Exploratory Analysis” (with Alan Sykes) Journal of Legal Analysis 9.2 (2017): 153-182. 

Working Papers

“The Domestic Impact of International Standards” R&R at International Studies Quarterly

  • Regulations are no longer a purely national affair. International standards now exist across a broad range of regulatory arenas, including those that may be central to domestic values, such as the regulation of health, safety, and the environment. Although a number of studies have looked at the domestic impact of globalization more generally, we continue to know very little about the effects of international standards, specifically. This paper investigates this issue, with an empirical focus on the regulation of pesticides. Using original data on changes to U.S. regulations between 1996 and 2015, the study identifies whether international standards have led to a weakening or strengthening of domestic rules. It finds that contrary to common fears, there is no evidence that international standards have pushed the United States towards laxity. The results not only contribute to the broader literature on the domestic effects of globalization, but they allay concerns that international standards could serve primarily as a regulatory ceiling, encouraging nations to sacrifice caution for economic gain.

“Exerting Influence Through Information: How Private Actors Win Preferential Policies Internationally" [email for latest draft]

  • A commonly cited benefit of policymaking at the international level is that it reduces the ability of special interests to benefit themselves at the expense of the greater good. Indeed, international agreements are often viewed as an intentional hands-tying device by governments seeking to free themselves from domestic political pressures. Yet the belief that international policy setting is insulated from domestically influential groups rests on the assumption that the mechanism of influence is specific to a national setting. What happens when these groups' influence stems not from their political clout but rather from their informational advantages? I argue that under these circumstances we should not expect international actors to perform any better than their domestic counterparts. In order to test this, I empirically evaluate the ability of agrochemical firms to win preferential outcomes domestically and internationally. I introduce a dataset that quantifies changes to thousands of agrochemical regulations across two decades, both in the U.S. and at the international, standard-setting level. I show that due to agrochemical companies' monopoly on relevant information, these actors have been as successful at winning their preferred regulatory outcomes internationally as they have domestically. My findings offer a counter to the claim that moving decisions to the international level is an effective strategy for reducing the influence of special interest groups.

“Stealing in Stealth: How Regimes Differ in Their Strategies of Expropriation” (with Jane Esberg) [email for latest draft]

  • A substantial literature concludes that democracies are less likely to engage in sovereign theft than autocracies. However, little attention has been paid to the strategies of theft regimes employ. We theorize that when democracies steal, they ought to utilize different methods than their autocratic counterparts. Using a dataset containing all expropriations of foreign direct investment that occurred in developing countries between 1960 and 2007, we show that rather than rely on outright nationalization, democracies are more likely to use methods such as forced sale or contract renegotiation, tools which are harder to detect and easier to justify to both the electorate and to potential investors. In fact, while democracies may be less likely than autocracies to nationalize foreign investment, they are as likely as autocracies to engage in more subtle forms of theft. Our findings suggest that by bundling types of expropriation, scholars may be overlooking important differences in regime strategies. Moreover, as overt forms of sovereign theft become increasingly less common, there may be reason to suspect that the democratic advantage in protecting foreign investments could be coming to an end.

"After Tariffs: How Regulatory Provisions Jeopardize Support for Trade Deals" (with Elisabeth van Lieshout) [email for latest draft]

  • As tariffs move closer to zero internationally, trade agreements have increasingly begun to focus on non-tariff barriers to trade. Recent public debate reflects these changes, with both opponents and supporters of trade agreements regularly emphasizing their potential regulatory effects. Yet public opinion research remains almost entirely focused on citizens' preferences over increased movement of goods, with little consideration of the regulatory changes that these larger trade flows would require. By ignoring what has become a central feature of the free-trade debate, we limit our understanding of the domestic politics of trade today. Our study seeks to fill this gap using a combination of conjoint and vignette experiments embedded in original, nationally representative surveys conducted in the U.S. and the Netherlands. We find that regulatory measures often pointed to as increasing the appeal of agreements, such as improved labor and environmental standards or better health and safety protections, do little to garner public support. By contrast, less popular regulatory measures such as harmonization with foreign rules often have a large, negative effect on people's attitudes towards trade deals. This suggests that as trade agreements increasingly become regulatory agreements, their path to public approval will become more challenging.

Book Project

Precaution in the Private Interest 
 

Other Publications

“Targeted Killings: Does Drone Warfare Violate International Law?” Journal of Public and International Affairs (2011): 68-87.